Significance of Disk Failure Prediction in Datacenters by Basak, Jayanta & Katz, Randy H.
Significance of Disk Failure Prediction in Datacenters 
 
JAYANTA BASAK, NetApp Inc. 
RANDY H. KATZ, University of California, Berkeley 
 
Modern datacenters assemble a very large number of disk drives under a single roof. Even if economic and technical 
factors where to make individual drives more reliable (which is not at all clear, given the commoditization of the 
technology), their sheer numbers combined with their ever increasing utilization in a well-balanced design makes achieving 
storage reliability a major challenge. In this paper, we assess the challenge of storage system reliability in the modern 
datacenter, and demonstrate how good disk failure prediction models can significantly improve the reliability of such 
systems. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
“Big data” imposes new challenges for datacenter storage. Datacenters are still mostly dominated 
by hard disk storage. Recent studies reveal that SSDs are also vulnerable to failures [Schroeder et 
al. 2016]. Google wants to see storage technology evolve to meet the demands of cloud computing 
by adopting less reliable hard disks [Brewer et al. 2016] and Google envisages new hard disk 
format design for data centers. As storage capacity and the number of disks increase, data loss 
becomes not just a possibility but inevitable. The sheer size and scale of data movement between 
applications and storage in a large-scale datacenter renders defects more prevalent. When 
combined with the inevitable operational failures in mechanical devices, this increasingly results 
in unrecoverable data loss. Data protection in datacenters is now a critical issue. As far back as 
2008, Google reported suffering a disk failure every time they executed a 6-hour long petabyte sort 
across 48,000 disks. In the case of correlated failure (i.e., due to the effect of physical conditions 
[9]), further aggravates the risk of data loss. A strategy to avoid it is to develop accurate prediction 
of impending disk failure events, so the data of the faulty disks can be copied to healthy disks with 
suitable lead time. 
 
Since 1994, disk manufacturers developed self-monitoring technology to predict failures early 
enough to allow users to back-up their data [Hughes et al. 2002]. The Self-Monitoring and 
Reporting Technology (SMART) system uses attributes collected during normal operation (and 
during off-line tests) to set a failure prediction flag. The SMART flag is a signal read by operating 
systems and third-party software to warn users of impending drive failure. Some of the attributes it 
uses include counts of track seek retries, write faults, reallocated sectors, head fly heights, and 
high temperature. Most attributes are error count data, implying positive integer data values, and a 
pattern of increasing attribute values over time indicates impending failure. SMART essentially 
provides information about certain primitive disk health. Currently, all manufacturers use a 
threshold algorithm which triggers a SMART flag when any attribute exceeds a predefined value. 
The thresholds are set conservatively to avoid false alarms at the expense of predictive accuracy, 
with an acceptable false alarm rate on the order of 0.1%. For the SMART algorithm currently 
implemented in drives, manufacturers estimate the detection rate to be 3 − 10%. Since only 
thresholding the SMART statistics does not yield enough prediction accuracy, a large number of 
attempts have been made to improve the accuracy using various different machine learning models 
and other measures. 
 
 
 To improve SMART’s failure prediction accuracy, [Hamerly and Elkan 2001] employed a 
Bayesian modeling approach. They tested on a dataset concerning 1936 drives, achieving failure 
detection rates of 55% for naive Bayes classifier at about 1% FAR. Another study was performed 
by [Hughes et al. 2002]. They used a Wilcoxon rank-sum test to build prediction models. They 
proposed two different strategies: multivariate test and ORing single attribute test. Their methods 
were tested on 3,744 drives. The highest detection rate achievable was 60% with 0.5% FAR. 
[Murray et al. 2004] compared the performance of SVM, unsupervised clustering, rank-sum test 
and reverse arrangements test. In subsequent work [Murray et al. 2005], they developed a new 
algorithm, termed multiple-instance naive Bayes (mi-NB). They found that, on the dataset 
concerning 369 drives, ranksum test outperformed SVM for certain small set of SMART attributes 
(28.1% failure detection at 0% false failure detection rate). When using all features, SVM 
achieved the best performance of 50.6% detection with 0% FAR. In [Zhu et al. 2013], the authors 
applied back-propagation learning on a feed-forward neural network to train on the SMART 
attributes, and achieved a failure detection rate of 95% with reasonably low FAR. In [Featherstun 
and Fulp 2010], the authors used syslog event records instead of the SMART attributes and used 
support vector machine to mine the syslog messages for disk failure prediction. They achieved 
approximate 80% accuracy. In [Pinheiro et al. 2007], a very large number of disks were 
considered in a Google datacenter and the authors presented a comprehensive analysis of the 
correlation between failures and parameters believed to affect disk lifetime. One fact they reported 
in [Pinheiro et al. 2007] is that the temperature bears no direct correlation with disk failure 
patterns. 
 
In short, various predictive models have been built and reported in the literature to accurately 
predict the disk failure event with certain lead times. In datacenters, the implication of such 
predictions has not yet been systematically analyzed. In the event of a false prediction, the storage 
service provider incurs an extra cost and therefore the goal is to minimize the false prediction rate. 
On the other hand, to reduce the false prediction rate, the predictive models report low failure 
detection rate that in turn can result in a data loss event for large datacenter. 
 
In this paper, we present as a baseline a systematic study of data loss in large datacenters when the 
disk failure prediction is not accurate. We also analyze the cost implication of false predictions. 
We then consider a generic form of predictive models behavior in terms of the receiver operating 
characteristic (ROC) curve, and show that for certain fixed cost, the effect on mean-time-to-data-
loss (MTTDL) with respect to the predictive accuracy or the true failure detection rate. We find 
that the MTTDL follows a ‘knee’ of the curve with the prediction accuracy; i.e., after a certain 
predictive accuracy threshold, a small increase in accuracy yields a large gain in MTTDL. First we 
analyze the MTTDL for a datacenter using some generic protection mechanism. We then consider 
three protection case studies, namely RAID6, RAID triple parity, and Erasure Coding. We then 
analyze the implication of the true impending disk failure detection rate on the MTTDL. We also 
analyze the cost incurred due to false prediction. We analyze the implication of the impending disk 
failure prediction algorithms with empirical results. In doing the analysis of the impact of 
prediction accuracy of the disk failure algorithms for the datacenters, we make the following 
assumptions: (i) We consider that the datacenter as a large disk farm where the protection 
mechanism of all disks are same although in real datacenters, often this assumption may not be 
valid; (ii) We consider only the failures of disks – in practice, the disks are connected over 
network/nodes and the network/nodes themselves can fail which we do not include in our analysis; 
(iii) In this analysis, we assume the exponential failure distribution although in practice, the failure 
distribution deviates from the exponential distribution [Schroeder et al. 2016]. We consider the 
exponential distribution so that Markov model can be used to estimate the MTTDL for very large 
number of disks. For other distribution, no such theoretical model exists for large number of disks. 
As described in the paper [Elerath and Schindler 2014], certain more accurate models have been 
analyzed, however, it is difficult to extend that model for large number of disks. For large number 
of disks, only way to obtain MTTDL with failure distribution other than exponential, is to go 
through the simulation of the failure events. However, the simulation process does not scale for 
very large number of disks. We compare the theoretical model with simulation results on 
individual array; (iv) While considering the impact of wrong prediction, we analyze the disk 
replacement cost. The disk replacement cost is a quantitative number available within the 
company that includes the cost of maintenance center, people impact and the cost of the disk itself. 
In practice, there is an implication on SLA to the customer for data unavailability. Usually the 
SLA is agreed upon with the customer for disk replacement. In this analysis, we do not include the 
SLA conditions for predictive failure cases. In [Tai et al. 2014], the authors have analyzed a way 
of showing data replication mechanism without violating the SLA. In datacenter storage also, 
usually a certain percentage of the IO is reserved for the replication and rebuild operation so that 
customer workloads are not stopped completely during replication/rebuild operations. 
 
Finally, the intent of this paper is to show how any impending disk failure prediction algorithm 
should be useful (or not at all useful) for a datacenter or more precisely to a large disk farm. We 
do not intend to compare the existing disk failure algorithms since (i) the prediction accuracies 
reported in the literature so far use different types of measurements and telemetry data 
(environment) to design the algorithms which may not be applicable uniformly to all algorithms, 
(ii) the amount of training data considered widely differ for different algorithms. So, it is very 
difficult to have an apple-to-apple comparison of the prediction algorithms only using the reported 
prediction accuracies. Therefore, the intent of this paper is not to experimentally compare the 
benefits of the existing algorithms in a large datacenter of a large disk farm, but to provide a 
theoretical guideline about what kind of prediction accuracy can be meaningful for datacenter to 
deploy the prediction technology. 
 
2. RELIABILITY ANALYSIS FOR LARGE NUMBER OF DISKS  
We first provide a generalized framework for analyzing the mean time to data loss (MTTDL) of a 
system of disks by generalizing the model of analysis as provided in [Paris et al. 2012, Paris et al. 
2014]. Next we use the framework to estimate the MTTDL of different protection mechanisms. In 
general, disk failures may not follow the exponential distribution as studied in [Schroeder and 
Gibson 2007]. The operational failures can be better modeled by Weibull or Gamma distributions 
as studied in [Schroeder and Gibson 2007]. We assume that the disks fail independently. Once a 
disk fails, the recovery process immediately starts to recover the data. If multiple disks fail then 
the recovery of these disks can take place in parallel. We also assume that the recovery rate is 
exponentially distributed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1: A continuous time Markov chain of the disk failures 
Let  be the failure rate of the exponentially distributed failure process,  be the recovery rate of 
the exponentially distributed recovery process. Figure 3 shows a continuous time Markov chain of 
the entire failure process for different failure rates. The system is initially in state 0 which 
indicates that there is no failure and all disks are operational. Since there are N disks in the system, 
there can be N probability of one disk failure. After one disk failure, the system goes to state 1. 
The failed disk can be replaced and data can be recovered with a recovery probability  . Once the 
data is recovered the system returns to state 0. In State 1, if another disk fails then there may be 
data loss with a probability 1 . Since there are (N-1) operational disks in State 1, there is a 
probability  1)1( N  of data loss. If there is data loss, system moves to the data loss state L. If 
there is no data loss then system moves to State 2 with 2 disk failures with a 
probability  )1)(1( 1  N . Since both the failed disks can be replaced and recovered 
simultaneously, the system returns from State 2 to State 1 with a probability 2 . Extending this 
logic, we can say that the system can move from a state i to state i+1 with a 
probability  ))(1( iNi  and there is a probability  )( iNi  of data loss. If the data loss 
happens then the system moves to data loss state L. The system can return from state i+1 to state i 
with a probability )1( i . Let there be at most K disk failures after which the system cannot be 
returned to normal state if one more disk fails, and data loss becomes inevitable. In that case, 
1K and the system goes to data loss state L after one more disk fails. With constant rates of 
failure and recovery under the assumption of the exponentially distributed failure and recovery 
processes, we can express the transient changes in the probability of system states 
KPPPPP ,,,,, 3210   as the Kolmogorov system of differential equations [Trivedi 2008] given by 
Equation (1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
In Equation (2), Ki  2 , ,1)0(0 P and 0)0( iP for all 0i .First we obtain the Laplace 
transformation of the system of equations. The mean time to data loss (MTTDL) can be expressed 
as [Trivedi 2008]. 
      
(2) 
 
The loss in the system can be expressed as 
)(/)()()( sVsUssPsL L         (3) 
The loss function is derived from the continuous time Markov chain model in Laplace transformed 
space as described in [Trivedi 2008]. 
Where U(s) and V(s) are given as 
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          (5) 
with 11 K , and 0j for all j > K+1. 
The numerator U(s) in Equation (3) is given as 
 
     (6) 
Therefore, the loss function )(sL  is determined by )(s which in turn depends on the coefficients 
 . Equating the negative of derivative of the loss function and letting s=0, we obtain the MTTDL 
for given values of  .  
Therefore,           
          (7) 
 
 
Since the derivatives are difficult to express in closed form equations, we programmatically 
compute the MTTDL using recursive formulations instead. Depending on the system 
configuration, the values of  change and the respective MTTDLs change.  
2.1 Analysis for RAID6 
In RAID6, an array of disks is protected by two parity disks. For example, in (8+2) RAID6, we 
have 8 data disks and two parity disks. We consider the general case of l arrays of )2( n RAID6. 
RAID6 can protect against any two disk failures in an array. Therefore, we have 01  . If there 
are three disks failure in a single array then there is data loss. Therefore, we have 
 
 
          (8) 
 
where lnN )2(          (9) 
The numerator of Equation (8) is derived by considering the possible combination of data loss for 
three disk failures in one single array and then generalizing it to l arrays. Since there are n data 
disks in one array with 2 parity disks, it is the possible combinations for one array multiplied by l. 
The total number of disks is N = (n + 2)l. Therefore, the total number of possibilities of three disk 
failures is given in the denominator which include the cases of data loss events and no data loss 
events. We extend the same logic for all cases subsequently. 
In the case of four failures, we can select any one disk in addition to the configurations for three 
disk failure, and those results into data loss. Therefore, 
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In general, for any subsequent failure, we have 
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2.2 Analysis for RAID Triple Parity 
We consider that there are l arrays of (n + 3) disks, each array comprising of n data disks and 3 
parity disks. If there are three disks failures in any array then also RAID-TP is able to recover the 
data. Therefore, we have 
 
          (12) 
 
 
 
 
where N = (n+3)l. For any subsequent failures, we have   
))2(,1min(1 iii    for 4i .       (13) 
2.3 Erasure Code 
We derive the MTTDL for ),( nmn Reed-Solomon code in the same way as RAID-DP and 
RAID-TP. An ),( nmn RS code can protect against m disk failures but in the case of m + 1 disk 
failures there is a data loss. 
 
We consider that there are l arrays of )( mn  disks, each array comprising of n data disks and m 
extra disks (similar to parity disks) having the RS codes. If there are m disk failures then the RS 
code is able to recover the data. Therefore, 
0121  m         (14) 
If there is (m+1)th disk failure then we have 
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where lmnN )(  . For any subsequent disk failures, we have  
))2(,1min(1 ii i    for 1mi .       (16) 
 
 
3. PREDICTION ANALYSIS OF DISK FAILURES 
3.1 ROC Curve 
In predicting the disk failure events using machine learning techniques, two parameters are used to 
evaluate the prediction algorithm namely, the true positive rate (TPR) and false positive rate 
(FPR), and are defined as follows: 
failedactuallydisksofnumberTotal
failedbetopredictedcorrectlydisksofnumber
TPR      (17) 
failnotdidthatdisksofnumberTotal
failedbetopredictedyincorrectldisksofnumber
FPR      (18) 
Evidently the most desired prediction performance is TPR =1 and FPR = 0. In practice, the 
prediction algorithms are not ideal. If every fault event needs to be predicted then there are some 
false predictions. Whenever a false prediction happens, the perfect disk is replaced. Every 
replacement of a disk incurs some cost. Therefore, if the false positive rate is very high then it 
implies a very high maintenance cost to the data center. On the other hand, if we maintain a very 
low FPR then the resulting TPR may also be low. A low TPR may result into significant data loss 
that is even more crucial for a datacenter.  
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Figure 2: A typical ROC curve 
 
In general, the FPR vs. TPR curves are known as “receiver operating characteristic” (ROC) curve 
[Weiss 2006]. A typical ROC curve [Weiss 2006] is shown in Figure 2. For any random prediction 
algorithm that predicts failures uniformly distributed among the positive and negative samples, 
true positive rate becomes equal to false positive rate. Therefore the diagonal line in the ROC 
represents the performance of a truly unbiased random algorithm. If the ROC is above the 
diagonal line then the algorithm is not truly random and carries some predicting capability. An 
ideal algorithm will have TPR = 1 for all FPR, 10  FPR . For any realistic technique TPR 
increases as the FPR increases. Initially TPR increases very sharply with FPR and then the rate of 
increase in TPR slows down as the FPR increases. 
 
The performance of a prediction algorithm is often characterized by the “Area Under the ROC 
Curve” (AUC). For any truly unbiased random algorithm, AUC = 0.5. On the other hand, for an 
ideal algorithm, AUC = 1. We empirically model the ROC curve as 
1)1(  pp FPRTPR                     (19)       
where 1p  is a constant, and 10,10  TPRFPR . If p = 1 then the ROC corresponds to a 
random unbiased algorithm with TPR=FPR. As p , ROC corresponds to the ideal algorithm. 
We will analyze the implication of disk failure prediction algorithms for different AUC 
considering the empirical parametric form as in Equation (19). 
3.2 Implication of TPR and FPR 
For any disk failure correctly predicted, it has implication in the reduction of the data loss. Here 
we restrict ourselves to the data loss that happens due to disk failures. If there is a disk failure 
followed by an operational failure in the same RAID group during the reconstruction process then 
it implies to data loss event. If the failure event can be predicted successfully well ahead before the 
failure then the disk can be replaced with the necessary replication process of the stored data. In 
such a scenario, the data loss that can happen due to subsequent failures can be protected. In other 
words, for every correct prediction there is a reduction in the effective disk failure rate (since the 
disk is replaced in the operational condition with another new disk). In our analysis, we considered 
the failure rate as   with exponential distribution where the disks fail independently. If the failing 
disks are predicted to fail correctly then the effective failure rate becomes )1( TPR . When TPR 
= 1 i.e., all failure events are correctly predicted then all failing disks are replaced in the 
operational condition and there is no data loss. On the other hand if TPR = 0 then no failing disks 
are replaced and the failure rate remains the same as the original. We can therefore, derive the 
effect of correct failure prediction on the MTTDL using the modified failure rate )1( TPR . 
 Any incorrect failure prediction incurs an extra cost to the datacenter. In any datacenter, a disk that 
has not failed is replaced after a certain time period T (usually the average life-span of a disk). For 
example, in many enterprises, a disk is replaced after five years, i.e., T = 5 years. Let us assume 
that the datacenter has N disks. Therefore, if the present time instant is t = 0 then all N disks are 
operational from time t = -T to t= 0. Let us assume that the installation time of the disks (in new 
condition) is uniformly distributed over t = -T to t = 0. Therefore, the total number of disks failing 
in this period (assuming exponential distribution of failure) can be computed as the expected value 
that a disk will fail during a period t = 0 to t=T multiplied by the total number of disks since the 
installation period of disks are uniformly distributed. Therefore, the total number of disks that are 
failed over a period of T can be expressed as )1( TeN  . Therefore, the total number of disks 
failing per unit time is  
)1( Te
T
N           (20) 
At any instant, the total number of disks not failing is given as 
)1( Te
T
N
N           (21) 
Therefore, the additional non-faulty disks that are predicted to be failed (and replaced) is given as 
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Let c be the cost of replacing one disk then the total additional cost is given as 
 
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N
NFPRcCost 1        (23) 
For example, if FPR = 0 then there is no additional cost. On the other hand, if FPR = 1, then all 
non-failing disks are replaced. In other words, all disks are replaced at a particular unit time. In our 
analysis, we consider the unit time as the time to replace a failing disk including all logistics. For 
example, whenever a prediction about a possible failure happens, the admin needs to check the 
inventory for new disks. If it is not available in the local inventory then it has to be imported from 
another inventory. Then the data in the existing disk need to be copied on the new disk. Finally the 
existing disk needs to be replaced with the new disk. If the entire process takes 6 hours then the 
prediction must happen before 6 hours of actual failure. The disk replacement cost c includes the 
cost of the new disk, the cost of copying the existing data onto the new disk, the labor cost of 
replacing the existing disk with the new disk, the cost of maintenance center of rechecking (and 
possible repair) the faulty disk. An approximate order of the cost is estimated as 
375$c (available from the company’s internal process). In practice, the disk replacement also 
involves SLA to the customer. Usually for data replication and rebuild a fraction of the IO is 
dedicated to this purpose apart from the usual workload IO. We do not consider the SLA in our 
present analysis since it is very difficult to quantify that factor. 
 
4. ANALYSIS RESULTS 
In this section, we analyze the results of implication of failure prediction. We first consider a data 
protection mechanism using RAID6. We consider (8+2) RAID6 configuration and there are 10000 
such RAID groups resulting into 80,000 data disks and 20,000 parity disks in a datacenter totaling 
100,000 disks. We consider the average life-span of a disk as 5 years such that the average rate of 
failure in the exponentially distributed failure process is )241825/(1  per hour. We vary the 
mean time to recovery (MTTR) from 5 hours to 10 hours. Figure 3 shows the mean time to data 
loss (MTTDL) in terms of the number of days as we increase the TPR (the FPR can be assumed to 
be constant and does not affect the MTTDL). From Figure 3, we observe that initially MTTDL is 
very flat and does not increase much even if we increase the TPR. As the TPR becomes close 
0.78, the MTTDL rises above five years for an MTTR = 5 hours. On the other hand, for an MTTR 
= 10 hours, TPR should be greater than 0.88 in order to have an MTTDL greater than 5 years. 
Note that in a large datacenter and MTTR = 5 hours is an aggressive estimate whereas an MTTR = 
10 hours is more reasonable. So with reasonable maintenance conditions, a failure prediction 
algorithm should be able to predict with almost 90% true positive rate in order to maintain at least 
5 years of mean time to data loss for a large datacenter having 100,000 disks using RAID6 
protection mechanism. Figure 3 reveals that MTTDL for a large datacenter changes with the TPR 
in a similar way to the “hockey-stick” curve where latency changes with the IOPS in a storage 
system. This behavior is a general behavior irrespective of the failure distribution of the disks. 
This happens due to the fact that as TPR increases, the effective mean time to failure increases. 
When TPR becomes 100%, the mean time to failure becomes infinity (always the failing disks are 
replaced) and MTTDL becomes infinity or there will be no data loss. This very fact is true 
irrespective of the failure distribution of the disks. Depending on the number of disks, failure 
distribution and the protection mechanism, there will be a cut-over point on TPR for which 
MTTDL will be above a certain threshold and the MTTDL rises to infinity and the TPR goes to 
100%. 
 
As expressed in Equation (23), the additional cost to company due to wrong prediction is linearly 
proportional to the FPR. We show the dependency of the additional cost on FPR in Figure 4 where 
we assume that c = $375. The additional cost is simply linear with the false positive rate of 
prediction, the slope of which depends on the size of the datacenter (i.e., the number of disks 
present in the datacenter) and the cost of replacing each disk. Figure 4 is just a linear curve that 
represents the simple cost model that we consider. 
We next analyze the implication of additional cost on MTTDL. We consider the parametric form 
of the ROC curve as in Equation (19). From Figures 5 and 6, we see that with the increase in 
AUC, there is a sharp increase in MTTDL for the same additional cost. Even for the very high 
values of AUC (such as above 0.95), a small increase in AUC results in significant increase in the 
MTTDL.  
 
 
Figure 3: MTTDL vs. True positive rate of failure prediction 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Additional cost vs. false positive rate of failure prediction 
 
 
 
Figure 5: MTTDL vs. Additional cost for different AUC of failure prediction 
 
 
 
 
             Figure 6: MTTDL vs. AUC of prediction for different additional costs 
 
 
In Table 1, we show the effect of TPR of disk failure prediction algorithms on the MTTDL for 
various data protection mechanisms including RAID6, RAID triple parity and (20,16) RS code. In 
all cases, we considered 80000 data disks. We keep the number of data disks to be same in all 
three cases (i.e., 80,000 data disks) and the number of parity disks changes depending on the 
protection mechanism. Our intent to keep the capacity same to ensure the datacenter is capable of 
storing the same amount of data in all three cases. For (8+2) RAID6, the datacenter requires 
20,000 parity disks; for (8+3) RAID-TP, the datacenter requires 30,000 parity disks additionally, 
and for (20,16) erasure code, the datacenter requires 20,000 parity disks which is the same as in 
the case of RAID6. 
 
Next we present certain simulation results on the MTTDL. We used the disk failure events in 
reported in the company install-base and the data has been analyzed in [Magie et al. 2015]. The 
analysis revealed that enterprise near-line class drives have approximately constant failure rates 
governed by exponential failure distribution. Relatively low-cost archival hard disk drives are 
subject to early-life decreasing failure rate and a subtle and significant wear-out problems 
governed by bathtub curves that is a resultant of the mixture of exponential and Weibull 
distribution. Within the company, there are extensive simulation of the failures of disk drives 
validated from the field data (most of which cannot be revealed due to confidentiality agreement 
with the customers). The best fit of the distribution is a combination of exponential and Weibull 
distribution, representing a drive that, in addition to its intrinsic failure mechanisms, also has a 
wear out failure mechanism [Schroeder and Gibson 2007]. An exponential distribution with a 
mean-time-to-failure of 5 years and a Weibull distribution with a scale parameter of 70,000 hours 
and a shape parameter of 4.0 were used in the simulations.  Considering the data protection 
mechanisms deployed in the various customer bases, the simulation results are available for 
(16+2) RAID-DP [Corbett et al. 2004] and (24+3) RAID-Triple Parity [Goel and Corbett 2012]. 
We compare the MTTDL of single array of (16+2) and (24+3) configurations with our theoretical 
models. In the simulation, MTTDL of (16+2) RAID-DP is reported to be 2.083*106 days whereas 
in the theoretical model we obtain 2.519*106 days considering mean-time-to-failure as 5 years and 
MTTR as 24 hours. With the same simulation model and drive parameters, the simulation results 
reported within the company for (24+3) RAID-TP was 4.63*107 days whereas the theoretical 
model yielded 1.61*108 days which is roughly 3.5 times more than the simulation results 
available. Note that, the simulation (in the company) was performed using a mixture of 
exponential and Weibull distribution to fit the failure characteristics of the second class of drives. 
 
 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we presented a systematic analysis of the significance of the disk failure prediction 
algorithms. We analyzed the effect of true positive rate in prediction on the MTTDL in a large 
data center. We also analyzed the additional cost penalty against the false positive rate of 
prediction. An interesting outcome of this analysis is that the effectiveness of the prediction 
algorithms suddenly increases in terms of MTTDL beyond a certain true positive rate. In other 
words, the TPR vs. MTTDL curve has a ‘knee’ that is very similar to the latency vs. IOPS curve. 
This nature of the MTTDL vs. TPR curve is for all three data protection mechanisms that we 
analyzed. This analysis also shows what kinds of TPR and FPR are expected for a data center to 
maintain a certain threshold of MTTDL against a certain amount of budget leading to an 
expectation setting of the designed disk failure prediction algorithms. 
 
 
Table 1: MTTDL vs. MTTR for different TPR with different data protection mechanisms 
 
TPR MTTR 
(hours) 
MTTDL (in days) 
RAID6 
(8+2) 
RAID-TP 
(8+3) 
RS Code 
(20,16) 
80 5 192.94 7.5x104 5.85x107 
10 1.56 39.73 3.51x103 
15 0.27 1.51 31.32 
85 5 2.61x103 3.19x106 5.74x109 
10 12.5 986 2.22x105 
15 1.13 18.14 1073 
90 5 9.31x104 5.96x108 2.67x1012 
10 385 1.5x105 1.17x108 
15 18.75 1.48x103 3.33x105 
95 5 6.91x106 3.06x1011 -- 
10 1.86x105 1.19x109 5.94x1012 
15 7.82x103 9.6x106 1.72x1010 
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